Last data update: May 13, 2024. (Total: 46773 publications since 2009)
Records 1-5 (of 5 Records) |
Query Trace: Rebmann C[original query] |
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Modifications to student quarantine policies in K-12 schools implementing multiple COVID-19 prevention strategies restores in-person education without increasing SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk, January-March 2021 (preprint)
Dawson P , Worrell MC , Malone S , Fritz SA , McLaughlin HP , Montgomery BK , Boyle M , Gomel A , Hayes S , Maricque B , Lai AM , Neidich JA , Tinker SC , Lee JS , Tong S , Orscheln RC , Charney R , Rebmann T , Mooney J , Rains C , Yoon N , Petit M , Towns K , Goddard C , Schmidt S , Barrios LC , Neatherlin JC , Salzer JS , Newland JG . medRxiv 2022 21 Objective: To determine whether modified K-12 student quarantine policies that allow some students to continue in-person education during their quarantine period increase schoolwide SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk following the increase in cases in winter 2020-2021. Method(s): We conducted a prospective cohort study of COVID-19 cases and exposures among students and staff (n=65,621) in 103 Missouri public schools. Participants were offered free, saliva-based RT-PCR testing. An adjusted Cox regression model compared hazard rates of school-based SARS-CoV-2 infections between schools with a modified versus standard quarantine policy. Result(s): From January-March 2021, a projected 23 (1%) school-based transmission events occurred among 1,636 school close contacts. There was no difference in the adjusted hazard rates of school-based SARS-CoV-2 infections between schools with a modified versus standard quarantine policy (hazard ratio=1.00; 95% confidence interval: 0.97-1.03). Discussion(s): School-based SARS-CoV-2 transmission was rare in 103 K-12 schools implementing multiple COVID-19 prevention strategies. Modified student quarantine policies were not associated with increased school incidence of COVID-19. Modifications to student quarantine policies may be a useful strategy for K-12 schools to safely reduce disruptions to in-person education during times of increased COVID-19 community incidence. Copyright The copyright holder for this preprint is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. This article is a US Government work. It is not subject to copyright under 17 USC 105 and is also made available for use under a CC0 license. |
Modifications to student quarantine policies in K-12 schools implementing multiple COVID-19 prevention strategies restores in-person education without increasing SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk, January-March 2021.
Dawson P , Worrell MC , Malone S , Fritz SA , McLaughlin HP , Montgomery BK , Boyle M , Gomel A , Hayes S , Maricque B , Lai AM , Neidich JA , Tinker SC , Lee JS , Tong S , Orscheln RC , Charney R , Rebmann T , Mooney J , Rains C , Yoon N , Petit M , Towns K , Goddard C , Schmidt S , Barrios LC , Neatherlin JC , Salzer JS , Newland JG . PLoS One 2022 17 (10) e0266292 OBJECTIVE: To determine whether modified K-12 student quarantine policies that allow some students to continue in-person education during their quarantine period increase schoolwide SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk following the increase in cases in winter 2020-2021. METHODS: We conducted a prospective cohort study of COVID-19 cases and close contacts among students and staff (n = 65,621) in 103 Missouri public schools. Participants were offered free, saliva-based RT-PCR testing. The projected number of school-based transmission events among untested close contacts was extrapolated from the percentage of events detected among tested asymptomatic close contacts and summed with the number of detected events for a projected total. An adjusted Cox regression model compared hazard rates of school-based SARS-CoV-2 infections between schools with a modified versus standard quarantine policy. RESULTS: From January-March 2021, a projected 23 (1%) school-based transmission events occurred among 1,636 school close contacts. There was no difference in the adjusted hazard rates of school-based SARS-CoV-2 infections between schools with a modified versus standard quarantine policy (hazard ratio = 1.00; 95% confidence interval: 0.97-1.03). DISCUSSION: School-based SARS-CoV-2 transmission was rare in 103 K-12 schools implementing multiple COVID-19 prevention strategies. Modified student quarantine policies were not associated with increased school incidence of COVID-19. Modifications to student quarantine policies may be a useful strategy for K-12 schools to safely reduce disruptions to in-person education during times of increased COVID-19 community incidence. |
Pilot Investigation of SARS-CoV-2 Secondary Transmission in Kindergarten Through Grade 12 Schools Implementing Mitigation Strategies - St. Louis County and City of Springfield, Missouri, December 2020.
Dawson P , Worrell MC , Malone S , Tinker SC , Fritz S , Maricque B , Junaidi S , Purnell G , Lai AM , Neidich JA , Lee JS , Orscheln RC , Charney R , Rebmann T , Mooney J , Yoon N , Petit M , Schmidt S , Grabeel J , Neill LA , Barrios LC , Vallabhaneni S , Williams RW , Goddard C , Newland JG , Neatherlin JC , Salzer JS . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2021 70 (12) 449-455 Many kindergarten through grade 12 (K-12) schools offering in-person learning have adopted strategies to limit the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19 (1). These measures include mandating use of face masks, physical distancing in classrooms, increasing ventilation with outdoor air, identification of close contacts,* and following CDC isolation and quarantine guidance(†) (2). A 2-week pilot investigation was conducted to investigate occurrences of SARS-CoV-2 secondary transmission in K-12 schools in the city of Springfield, Missouri, and in St. Louis County, Missouri, during December 7-18, 2020. Schools in both locations implemented COVID-19 mitigation strategies; however, Springfield implemented a modified quarantine policy permitting student close contacts aged ≤18 years who had school-associated contact with a person with COVID-19 and met masking requirements during their exposure to continue in-person learning.(§) Participating students, teachers, and staff members with COVID-19 (37) from 22 schools and their school-based close contacts (contacts) (156) were interviewed, and contacts were offered SARS-CoV-2 testing. Among 102 school-based contacts who received testing, two (2%) had positive test results indicating probable school-based SARS-CoV-2 secondary transmission. Both contacts were in Springfield and did not meet criteria to participate in the modified quarantine. In Springfield, 42 student contacts were permitted to continue in-person learning under the modified quarantine; among the 30 who were interviewed, 21 were tested, and none received a positive test result. Despite high community transmission, SARS-CoV-2 transmission in schools implementing COVID-19 mitigation strategies was lower than that in the community. Until additional data are available, K-12 schools should continue implementing CDC-recommended mitigation measures (2) and follow CDC isolation and quarantine guidance to minimize secondary transmission in schools offering in-person learning. |
Network approach for prevention of healthcare-associated infections
Horan TC , Arnold KE , Rebmann CA , Fridkin SK . Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2011 32 (11) 1143-4 We applaud the successful reduction of healthcare-associated infection (HAI) rates achieved by hospitals | that participated for 5 years or more in the Duke Infection | Control Outreach Network (DICON), as described by Anderson and colleagues in their recent report.1 | DICON provides a successful example of HAI reduction, using validated, | risk-adjusted local data to drive prevention activities, and it | adds to existing evidence supporting this HAI prevention | strategy.2 | " | 4 | To help ensure an accurate understanding of the | current landscape of HAI-reporting infrastructures that can | contribute to such reductions, we would like to clarify that | the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) can, and in | some states does, also function much as DICON does to | provide complete, validated, risk-adjusted data for local action, with the distinction that funding for NHSN and, particularly, validation requires public support, whereas DICON | is funded directly by the facilities it serves. We disagree with | the authors' statement that NHSN data are "obtained from | convenience samples (ie, are not complete), are not validated, | and are not fed back to individual hospitals in a timely fashion," for the following reasons. While it is true that not all | US hospitals report HAIs to NHSN and participation in | NHSN is still voluntary in some states, increasingly it is being | used as a platform for state mandatory reporting of HAIs (23 | states and the District of Columbia as of July 2011). Also, | beginning in January 2011, NHSN became the reporting tool | for central line-associated bloodstream infections in hospitals | with intensive care units that participate in the Hospital Inpatient Quality Reporting Program of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).5 | The result is that now | more than 4,200 of the 5,800 hospitals in the United States | belong to NHSN and are reporting data continuously on a | variety of HAIs, with central line-associated bloodstream infections and surgical site infections being the most common | focus of surveillance and reporting. Therefore, we believe that | as currently constituted, NHSN has become representative of | US hospitals for certain HAI types, and future expansion is | likely |
Effective state-based surveillance for multidrug-resistant organisms related to health care-associated infections
Duffy J , Sievert D , Rebmann C , Kainer M , Lynfield R , Smith P , Fridkin S . Public Health Rep 2011 126 (2) 176-85 In September 2008, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention sponsored a meeting of public health and infection-control professionals to address the implementation of surveillance for multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs)-particularly those related to health care-associated infections. The group discussed the role of health departments and defined goals for future surveillance activities. Participants identified the following main points: (1) surveillance should guide prevention and infection-control activities, (2) an MDRO surveillance system should be adaptable and not organism specific, (3) new systems should utilize and link existing systems, and (4) automated electronic laboratory reporting will be an important component of surveillance but will take time to develop. Current MDRO reporting mandates and surveillance methods vary across states and localities. Health departments that have not already done so should be proactive in determining what type of system, if any, will fit their needs. |
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